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In January 1944, historian Charles A. Beard asked Harvard 
law professor Thomas Reed Powell for his evaluation of the 
Supreme Court's recent performance. Beard had been among the 
most forceful critics of the old Court's response to the New Deal. 
Lashing out against its attempt "to confine the powers of govern-
ment within the narrowest possible limits," he had warned that the 
Constitution could not-and would not-survive without "loose 
and general interpretations of its general clauses" to allow "for the 
use of commensurate national power" to deal with the Depression.! 
He had even publicly supported Roosevelt's Court-packing scheme 
as the solution to the impasse.2 And he had hailed the Court's 
switch-in-time as a turning point in "the battle ... to preserve the 
balance of powers in government as distinguished from judicial 
supremacy." 3 
In the years that followed, Roosevelt transformed the Court 
with his own appointees.4 By then, however, Beard had soured on 
FDR.s How much that disillusionment colored his attitude toward 
the reconstituted Court must remain a matter of speculation. But 
there was no question of his disenchantment. "Maybe," he wrote 
Powell, 
I am falling into the delusion that there were giants long ago, but it seems to me 
that, in the statements of facts and law, in the opinions, and in the animadversions 
of the Justices, the documents of the Court show increasing confusion and impreci-
sion-in thinking and writing. There is a marked tendency to resort to fancy phrase 
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making. So my question to you is: Are the intellectual standards of the Court 
falling, rising, or just in statu quo?6 
That Beard directed his question to Powell was not surprising. 
Their friendship dated from 1906 when Powell had begun to work 
toward a doctorate in political science at Columbia. 
Powell had been born April 29, 1880 in Richford, Vermont. 
His father was a local lawyer and banker who served simultane-
ously as treasurer of the University of Vermont. Graduating from 
that institution in 1900, Powell went on to Harvard Law School. 
After receiving his LL.B. in 1904, he practiced law for two years in 
Burlington, Vermont, before deciding to pursue graduate study in 
political science. He was awarded the Ph.D. in 1913 and was ap-
pointed associate professor of constitutional law with a seat in the 
Faculty of Law. Although he continued to offer courses in the De-
partment of Public Law, his law school work became the major fo-
cus of his energies. He was promoted to full professor in 1920, and 
three years later was named Ruggles Professor of Constitutional 
Law. In 1925, he accepted a call from Harvard Law School, where 
he became Langdell, and then Story, Professor. He retired from 
teaching in 1949, and died in Boston on August 16, 1955. Powell 
was a prolific writer; a bibliography compiled for his seventieth 
birthday listed almost four hundred articles, reviews, and com-
ments. The James S. Carpentier Lectures that he delivered at Co-
lumbia shortly before his death were published in 1956 as Vagaries 
and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation. 1 But he probably had 
most impact through his teaching. He was, a former student recal-
led, "vexatious and nasty and snide and, consequently somehow, 
stimulating. "s 
Powell and Beard were different personalities. Beard was by 
temperament an activist who did not shy from public involvement 
in support of his favored policies. By contrast, Powell cultivated an 
aura of Olympian detachment. But there was a remarkable degree 
of consonance in their substantive positions. Just as Beard had out-
6. Beard's shift from enthusiasm to disillusionment is traced in Braeman, The Histo-
rian as Activist: Charles A. Beard and the New Deal, 79 S. ATLANTIC Q. 364 (1980). 
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268 (1955); J. GOEBEL, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 241-
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A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967 
(1967). But recollections by four former students and colleagues-Erwin N. Griswold, Felix 
Frankfurter, Freund, and Henry M. Hart, Jr.-appeared after his death in 69 HARV. L. REv. 
793 (1956). 
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MAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 51 (1986). 
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raged the politically orthodox by imputing economic motivations to 
the framers of the Constitution, Powell was accused by those same 
quarters of undermining respect for the courts by teaching that judi-
cial decisions were influenced-even if not always consciously-by 
judges' social, economic, and psychological biases.9 Powell was 
fond of quoting an aphorism from William Graham Sumner that 
one could get out of a premise all that one had put into it. to Like 
Beard, he had no sympathy with the use of "liberty of contract" to 
strike down protective labor legislation without regard for the real 
world disparity in bargaining power between employers and their 
workers. II Like Beard, he had scant patience with the Court's pur-
ported distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects upon in-
terstate commerce to tie the hands of Congress in dealing with the 
crisis of the Depression.12 And though he was not a supporter of 
the Court-packing proposal, Powell welcomed the Court's about-
face to recognize that national problems required national 
solutions.B 
Powell had his quarrels with the new Court. He was probably 
most disturbed at the way its readiness to abandon long-established 
precedents threatened to undermine the law as a predictable guide 
for behavior. But he must be considered a friendly critic. He was 
sympathetic to many of the new developments. He even accepted 
the legitimacy of the double standard of review under the due pro-
cess clause, whereby the Court applied stricter scrutiny to legisla-
tion restricting so-called civil liberties than to statutes interfering 
with economic liberties.l4 He knew most of the individual Justices 
and had long-standing, personal ties with at least two: Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone, who had been dean of Columbia Law School 
9. See the complaints made by his archconservative colleague, William D. Guthrie, to 
Dean Harlan Fiske Stone on Jan. 14, 1915 and Nov. 29, 1916, quoted in J. GoEBEL, supra 
note 7, at 477. 
10. See Powell, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Income Taxation, in THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 51, 52 (R. Haig ed. 192 1). 
II. Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 545, 569 
(1924). 
12. Powell, Commerce. Pensions. and Codes II, 49 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1935). Powell 
was privately even more biting in his opinion of the Court's right wing: 
I think that Mr. Justice Butler knows just what he is up to and that he is playing 
God or Lucifer to keep the world from going the way he does not want it to. Suth-
erland seems to me a naive, doctrinaire person who really does not know the world 
as it is. His incompetence in economic reasoning is amazing . . . . Mr. Justice 
McReynolds is a tempestuous cad, and Mr. Justice Van Devanter an old dodo. 
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14. Powell, Conscience and the Constitution, in DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL UNITY 
19-23 (W. Hutchinson ed. 1941). 
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during most of his time there, and his former Harvard colleague, 
Felix Frankfurter. 
His views are especially significant because his standards for 
appraising Supreme Court performance were a major influence in 
shaping the direction oflaw school-based commentary. "More than 
has been generally recognized," Harvard Law School Dean Erwin 
N. Griswold observed at the time of his death, "Powell laid down 
the intellectual foundations for the developments in constitutional 
law which have been seen in the past twenty years. In the twenties 
he was an unorthodox and somewhat irreverent teacher of fledgling 
students. In the thirties and forties some of his students were no 
longer fledglings, and his influence was widely felt."Js 
Not much inclined to philosophical speculation, Powell never 
articulated a formal theory of constitutional adjudication. Rather, 
his underlying premises must be extrapolated from the detailed exe-
geses upon Supreme Court opinions that he presented in his writ-
ings and teaching. The nearest that Powell came to an explicit 
statement of his credo was in an undated memorandum in response 
to a proposal to abolish course examinations. 
[My] attitude, briefly put, is that the Supreme Court is authoritative, that their 
decisions must be accepted by the students to the extent that they are accepted by 
the court itself, that cases are not wrong because I would have decided them other-
wise or because the student would have decided them otherwise, are not wrong 
because they can't be fitted by me or by the student into a system. This attitude is 
that many of the formulae announced by the court are insufficient reasons for the 
decisions, that we must regard what the court actually does sometimes to the ne-
glect of what it says, that there are competing formulae that may be pulled by 
majority and minority, that the work of the court is predominantly that of making 
practical adjustments rather than of discovering doctrine, that doctrine is more 
often instrumental to opinion writing than to decision-reaching, that the necessity 
of drawing a line somewhere means that it is often drawn very narrowly between 
two cases so much alike that they would naturally be put on the same side of the 
line except that the repetition of the process in the succeeding close cases would 
shove the line farther to the right or to the left than the court thinks it ought to 
go. . . . My emphasis is on process, process, process, on particularities, particulari-
ties, particularities, on cases, cases [,] cases, on the contemporary court, on resolv-
ing competing considerations, on watching for practicalities not likely to be 
expressed in opinions in which the court pretends that the case is being decided by 
its predecessor rather than by itself.16 
That approach was the antithesis of the training Powell had 
when he himself was a student at Harvard Law School. Holding 
sway at that time was the Langdellian model of law as a science, 
with judges simply applying established general principles to indi-
15. 69 HARV. L. REV. 793, 794 (1956). 
16. Powell, Memorandum on Abolishing Course Examinations, (n.d., Box A, folder 
A9, Powell Papers). 
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vidual cases via a process of deductive logic. Powell's work with 
Frank J. Goodnow at Columbia marked the first step in his "getting 
de-Harvardized." A pioneer in the realistic school of political sci-
ence, Goodnow taught that the student of American government 
must look behind the formal structure laid down on paper to find 
how things were done in fact. Nor did he shy away from applying 
that same mode of analysis to judicial decisionmaking. "I couldn't 
escape seeing from him," Powell recalled, "how courts actually be-
haved in public law."J7 Under Goodnow's direction, Powell began 
his scholarly career with an investigation of what judges did in the 
emerging area of administrative law. He found that despite contin-
ued lip-service to a strict doctrine of separation of powers, the 
courts repeatedly had sanctioned departures from that principle. 
"The practical necessities of government," he concluded, "have 
compelled the courts to overcome the difficulties raised by the doc-
trine of the separation of powers. . . . The doctrine of the separation 
of governmental powers, then, as a complete denial of the capacity 
of one department of government to exercise a kind of power as-
sumed to belong peculiarly to one of the others, does not obtain in 
our public law beyond the confines of the printed page."Js 
The major focus of Powell's interest became the study of the 
constitutional problems arising out of the federal system-intergov-
ernmental tax immunities, state regulation and taxation impinging 
upon interstate commerce, and the scope of congressional power 
under the commerce clause. Although most of these cases involved 
technical and abstruse legal questions, even here Powell found a 
record of judicial twistings and turnings that belied the existence of 
controlling first principles. To the extent that the Court maintained 
a facade of consistency, that result was achieved by making disin-
genuous, even transparently meaningless, distinctions.J9 The only 
general rule he could discern regarding state regulation of com-
merce, for example, was that the states could regulate commerce 
but not too much in a given instance.2o The determinative role of 
judges' personal values and attitudes was even more apparent when 
broad questions of policy were at stake. Powell sharply attacked 
the Adkins decision striking down the District of Columbia mini-
17. Letter from Powell to Jerome Frank (Nov. 5, 1930) (Box A, folder AS, Powell 
Papers). For Goodnow, see H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION 
OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880's, at 325-28 (1950). 
18. Powell, Separation of Powers: Administrative Exercise of Legislative and Judicial 
Power, I. The Delegation of Power to Act, 27 PoL. Sci. Q. 215, 227-28, 238 (1912). 
19. See Powell, An Imaginary Judicial Opinion, 44 HARV. L. REv. 899 (1931 ). 
20. T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
178 (1956). 
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mum wage law for women, arguing that whether or not a statute 
constituted a deprivation of liberty in denial of due process, "de-
pends ... in large part upon the composition of the court of last 
resort at the particular time when the issue comes before it."21 And 
he showed how accidental factors prevented the case from reaching 
the Court until personnel changes had transformed a probable ma-
jority in favor of the legislation into a majority for its invalidation. 
Not only did such cases turn upon the Justices' "personal views of 
desirable governmental policy," but all too often the opinions con-
sisted of "patently argumentative justifications rather than inducing 
reasons. "22 
Powell thought it overly simplistic to assume-as Beard had 
appeared to do with the Founding Fathers-that human motivation 
was reducible to the pursuit of economic self-interest. Like the rest 
of humankind, judges were influenced by a complex set of values, 
attitudes, and emotions, of which they themselves were not always 
fully aware. 
Judges argue from undisclosed assumptions, as you and I argue from undisclosed 
assumptions. Judges seek their premises from facts, as you and I strive to do. 
Judges have preferences for social policies, as you and I. They form their judgments 
after the varying fashions in which you and I form ours. They have hands, organs, 
dimensions, senses, affections, passions. They are warmed and cooled by the same 
winter and summer and by the same ideas as a layman is . . . . Human beings 
performing a human task-that is the picture thrown on the screen for me by the 
words "constitutionallaw."23 
Even personality differences could not be ignored. Judges differed 
in the degree of self- confidence in the correctness of their decisions 
and thus in their conception of the judicial role. "This is why," he 
pointed out, "in explaining the determination of constitutional is-
sues we must take account of the temper, as well as of the outlook, 
of the judges before whom the issues chance to come."24 Powell's 
view of judicial behavior paralleled the position of the so-called 
legal realist school.2s But he did not feel fully comfortable with that 
label. The crux of his difficulties with legal realism lay in what he 
saw as its nihilistic implications. "Those who see law as judicial 
whim or fiat," he admonished, "are partly right, but only partly. 
21. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
22. Powell, supra note II, at 546, 553, 555. 
23. Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J. OF PHIL. PSYCHOLOGY 
AND SCI. METHODS 645, 648, 653 (1918). 
24. Powell, supra note II, at 573. 
25. Karl N. Llewellyn included Powell in his list of legal realists. K. LLEWELLYN, 
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 46-47, 74-76 (1962). He was simi-
larly classified in H. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS: A SuR-
VEY OF TAUGHT JURISPRUDENCE 254-56 (1951 ). 
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Those who see the law as only this or only that see but narrowly."26 
While individual idiosyncracy was inevitable in judicial deci-
sionmaking, Powell aspired to restrict-or at least to restrain-its 
role by persuading judges to stop taking refuge behind abstractions 
and instead examine the practical consequences of a decision in the 
real world. In his 1911 work Social Reform and the Constitution, 
Goodnow had called upon the Supreme Court to engage in con-
scious adaptation of the Constitution to the social changes wrought 
by industrialization.27 Even more influential in directing Powell to-
ward an instrumentalist conception of the law was his friendship 
with his fellow Vermonter John Dewey.2s "[S]ince law is a rule to 
govern human relations," Powell elaborated, 
the wisdom of any rule of law is essentially dependent upon its effect on human 
relations. But this effect is necessarily forecasted and evaluated by a process of 
ratiocination rather than of experimentation. And the ratiocination is all too sel-
dom controlled or guided by any special and exact knowledge of the social and 
economic conditions which create the need for Jaw .... [M]uch more of our legal 
reasoning needs to be subjected to the acid test of fact. 29 
When dealing with state regulation or taxation of commerce, the 
Court should "invoke practical considerations," or apply what he 
called "a little bit of common sense," to weigh the benefits to local 
community interests against the degree of interference with the na-
tional economy.Jo The crux of his indictment of the Court's restric-
tive interpretation of congressional power in SchechterJI was the 
Court's pronouncing "pontifical conclusions with all too little sign 
of mastery of the elements of the problems that the conclusions seek 
26. T. POWELL, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN ScHOL-
ARS 269, 279-80 (1941). 
27. For the significance of this work, see R. HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HIS-
TORIANS: TURNER, BEAR::>, FARRINGTON 202-03 (1968), and Belz, The Realist Critique of 
Constitutionalism in the Era of Reform, 15 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 288, 293 (1971). 
28. See Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924): "(G]eneral 
legal rules and principles are working hypotheses, needing to be constantly tested by the way 
in which they work out in concrete situations .... " /d. at 26. In an undated letter to Dewey 
(Box A, folder A4, Powell Papers), Powell recounted: 
how much I owe to you .... I certainly wasn't conscious of the ways judges think 
they think until we began to have talks together. I remember that one time very 
soon after I got to know you, I told you that legal cause was nothing but picking 
someone in the chain of causation upon whom for reasons of policy the Jaw wanted 
to impose the responsibility. I didn't know this a minute before I told you. It was 
merely finding an illustration of what you had been saying about something else. I 
had been taught legal cause as a branch of physics .... I don't think I'd be called a 
philosopher by most of the devotees of philosophy, but you have given me philoso-
phy as a tool to hew a path through my legal woods .... 
29. Powell, Law As a Cultural Study, 1917 A.B.A. REP. 572, 581. 
30. T. POWELL, supra note 20, at 139, 170, 176. 
31. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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to solve."32 
Powell, however, was not as thoroughgoing an instrumentalist 
as his accompanying rhetoric would suggest. While he acknowl-
edged that the social sciences had much to teach the legal fraternity, 
he recognized that the social sciences had not-and probably never 
would-supply definitive answers to controversial policy issues. 
And even if social scientists developed the tools to do so, he 
doubted if judges could acquire sufficient expertise in such matters 
to make more than a guess-timate about the social and economic 
consequences of a decision.33 More important, he himself had been 
only partially de-Harvardized. His own forte lie in the analytical 
parsing of judicial opinions, and he remained firmly convinced that 
the case-method of teaching law was the way par excellence of de-
veloping the ability to think.34 In order to limit judicial discretion, 
Powell's principal solution accordingly was to demand that judicial 
opinions "satisfy the mind of the trained observer" -i.e., the law 
school professor. At a minimum this standard required compe-
tency in the technical niceties: internal coherence, consistency with 
professed criteria, and fair treatment of the existing precedents 
whether favorable or not. The most vital ingredient, however, was 
"intellectual rectitude"; judges must "support their judgments with 
that degree of candor" that will provide "adequate disclosure of the 
real steps by which they have reached where they are."3s 
Powell was thus an intellectual father of what became known 
as the "Reasoned Elaboration" school of Supreme Court commen-
tary.36 Indeed, his mind was sufficiently complex and subtle that 
even this categorization requires qualification. He parted company 
with men like Herbert Wechsler who regarded adherence by the 
Court to so-called neutral principles, those applicable beyond the 
immediate case at bar, as the keystone of reasoned articulation.37 
32. Powell, supra note 12, at 238. 
33. See Powell, How Philosophers May Be Useful to Society, 31 INT'L. J. OF ETHICS 289 
(1920-1921). 
34. Powell, Law As a University Study, 19 COLUM. U.Q. 106, 109-11, 122-25 (1916-
1917). See the perceptive comments on this point in W. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW 
SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 118-22, 151-53 (1982). 
35. Powell, Some Aspects of American Constitutional Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 529, 549-
50, 552 (1940). 
36. The term appears to have been coined by one of Powell's former students, Henry M. 
Hart, Jr. For acknowledgment by one of the leading figures of the school of Powell's influ-
ence, see H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: SELECTED Es-
SAYS 27-28 (1961). The rise and underlying premises of this approach are examined in 
White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 
59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973). 
37. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I 
(1959). 
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Powell's judicial hero was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.; ergo he re-
tained a Holmesian skepticism about general principles deciding 
particular cases.3s The "principle of polarity," which Powell 
learned from his friend Morris R. Cohen, reinforced this skepti-
cism. According to it, the world consisted of "opposites" whose 
"seeming contradictions" could be resolved "by finding the proper 
distinctions and qualifications."39 Such pragmatic adjustment was 
inherent in Powell's own major scholarly interest, namely the prob-
lem of national-state relations in the federal system. But he thought 
the same mode of analysis was applicable when the question was, as 
in Gobitis,4D deciding what was owed to Caesar and what to individ-
ual conscience. "The logical solution of a dilemma is to seize one 
horn and neglect the other. The logical solution is a tour de force. 
But there remains the solution by judgment, and judgment is not 
exercised by confining consideration to the merits of the chosen 
horn. . . . Reconciliation involves weighing of competing considera-
tions. It involves choice between them as to which shall prevail in 
the particular conftict."41 
Men of good will and sound intellect inevitably would disagree 
on what choice should be made. Powell himself thought the major-
ity in Gobitis had struck the balance wrongly: "The public need for 
coerced and insincere saluting of the flag by little children seems to 
me to be trivial .... "42 In the final analysis, therefore, the only 
meaningful restraint upon judicial discretion was political in the 
broad sense. Powell thought it was irrelevant to debate whether the 
framers had intended the Supreme Court to exercise a veto over 
legislation. The issue had been settled by the long public acquies-
cence in the practice. "To one who views a constitution of govern-
ment as something deeper and more vital than a written parchment, 
the power over legislation now exercised by the judiciary rests on as 
firm a foundation of grant as to any of the carefully enumerated 
functions of the legislature or of the executive."43 The survival of 
individual decisions similarly depended upon popular acceptance in 
the long run. Here was the lesson he saw in the 1937 crisis. To 
paraphrase his conclusion about the power of the states over com-
38. T. PoWELL, supra note 20, at 33-40. 
39. M. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE: AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD 165-67 (1931). For the importance of this concept in Cohen's thought, see D. 
HOLLINGER, MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL 79, 117-21, 232-33 (1975). On 
Powell's friendship with Cohen, see L. ROSENFIELD, PORTRAIT OF A PHILOSOPHER: MORRIS 
R. COHEN IN LIFE AND LETTERS at xii (1962). 
40. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
41. Powell, supra note 14, at 26, 24. 
42. /d. at 29. 
43. Powell, The Courts and the People, 27 PoL. Sci. Q. 682, 682 (1912). 
152 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 5:143 
merce, the Supreme Court had power but not too much. Judicial 
review could survive so long as the Justices exercised due restraint. 
"So long as courts have the last say we have judicial government, 
whether courts approve or condemn what others have done. This, 
however, still leaves the vast gulf between the alternatives. Judicial 
condonation puts responsibility onto the political agencies which re-
main free to respond to popular pressure for change."44 
Powell would bring those standards of judgment to bear when 
making his reply to Beard's query.4s 
February 3, 1944 
Dear Charlie: 
I think you are right that the Supreme Court opinions show 
increasing confusion and imprecision in thinking and writing and 
that F.F. at least has in the past shown a marked tendency to resort 
to fancy phrase making. He seems to me of late, however, to have 
been curbing this disposition. 
Accepting all this, however, I would not say that the intellec-
tual standards of the Court are falling. I think that they have more 
able intellects on the Court now than at any earlier season in my 
memory, though no one is such a giant as Holmes or Brandeis. One 
trouble is that they suffer somewhat from intellectualism. Felix in 
dissent and in concurring opinions has devoted himself to a consid-
erable extent to slamming inadequacies in the intellectual methods 
of his opponents and to that extent neglecting to deal with the issues 
of the case. He is still the professor correcting the intellectual 
processes of others, and in general the intellectual processes by 
which the results are supported may have little relation to the way 
those results are reached or to the wisdom of them. 
The reason for confusion and imprecision is that the judges are 
making a lot of new law without confessing it. Black is still the 
legislator wanting each case to go the way he wants it to go, irre-
spective of how it fits into the established system or of what it does 
to that system. He is exceedingly competent intellectually and an 
acute debater. As such a debater, he invokes analogues that a thor-
ough legist would know are inapposite. Doubtless he knows so too. 
His ideal is to write so that laymen can understand his opinions, 
and he puts things in that look much better to laymen than they do 
44. Powell, Our High Court Analyzed, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1944, (Magazine), at 45. 
45. Box A, folder Al9, Powell Papers. I wish to thank Professor Harry S. Martin, Ill, 
Librarian at the Harvard Law School Library, for permission to publish. 
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to lawyers.46 
The only real intellectual flop on the Court is Murphy. 
Stanley Reed is not overly keen intellectually, but he is a solid 
citizen and a fine human being. He votes with the Government in 
the fields in which he argued for the Government when Solicitor 
General. In other fields he wabbles, and I don't find in him any 
firm rudder. The boys who argue before him say that he asks blun-
dering questions which deflect them from the real matter in issue. I 
don't think that he transmutes a record into clarity or succinctness. 
If you will compare what he did with what Bill Douglas did in some 
intricate railroad reorganization cases, you will see that Bill after 
mastering his material got outside it and presented it as his own, 
whereas Stanley presented it in undigested form. 
Rutledge has a good, pedestrian mind and does all his work 
slowly and carefully. There are no flashes, and he was not called 
worthy of the top league in law teaching. He was appointed for 
reasons of geography and social slant. 
Bob Jackson seems to me on the whole to be the best of the 
new ones. He doesn't have a Grand Rapids mind for any style of 
intellectual or social furniture. He has gayety and good sense. I 
think it was wise for the President to make Stone Chief Justice 
rather than Bob, but I should like to see Bob get promoted after 
Stone retires. 
Bill Douglas is a superior workman with a determined slant to 
the left, being almost uniformly subservient to Black's leadership. 
He can take the most involved records and handle them adequately 
and can do more than his share of the job. Felix in private talks 
bitterly about both Black and Douglas, saying that the former has 
no sense of legal system and cares only for picking the preferred 
winner in a case and that the latter is running for President. 
Felix regards himself as a disciple of James Bradley Thayer 
and Mr. Justice Holmes, with his main tenet to live up to the canon 
of not declaring anything unconstitutional unless its unconstitution-
ality is free from doubt. I don't think that he does live up to that 
canon when he says that state courts cannot enjoin picketing.47 Un-
46. In a follow-up letter to Beard (June 6, 1944, Box A, folder Al9, Powell Papers), 
Powell gave a more negative appraisal: "I am pretty much off Mr. Justice Black at present. 
At the beginning he was pretty frank in honest rejection of long-established canons. Now 
that there are new canons finding a place, he is sly and crooked in claiming for them more 
spread than what they merit. He also does some pretty lame things intellectually or 
judgmatically." 
47. Frankfurter was more ambivalent upon this issue than Powell indicates here. In 
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), he did invalidate a state court 
injunction against stranger picketing (that is, picketing by workers not employed by the pick-
eted firm) on first amendment grounds. Although the Illinois Supreme Court had upheld the 
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less one is absolute in adherence to the canon, he has to make a 
choice in every case and is responsible for his choice. 
Felix does, however, care for legal traditions and for the judi-
cial institution, and this explains many of the stands which he takes 
for which his liberal friends criticize him. Mark Childs,4s who 
came back from England recently, told me that Harold Laski was 
quite off Felix.49 I can't help surmising that some of Felix's posi-
injunction on the rationale that those enjoined were not employees of the firm, Frankfurter 
held that "a state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free 
communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and work-
ers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him." /d. at 326. 
And in Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943), he spoke for a unani-
mous bench in overturning on the basis of Swing a state court injunction against picketing a 
cafeteria in which the owners were the only workers. But he balked against extending this 
protection of picketing to include those not "engaged in the same industry." Swing, 312 U.S. 
at 326. In Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 
722 ( 1942), Frankfurter spoke for a five-to-four majority in upholding a Texas court's injunc-
tion, as in violation of that state's antitrust law, against picketing by a carpenters union local 
or a restaurant whose owner had engaged a contractor employing nonunion labor to con-
struct a building not connected with the restaurant. While "peaceful picketing may be a 
phase of the constitutional right of free utterance," he concluded, the states still had the 
power to forbid the parties to a labor dispute "to conscript neutrals having no relation to 
either the dispute or the industry in which it arose." /d. at 727-28. And in Milkwagon 
Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941), he had upheld for a 
six-to-three bench the power of state courts to enjoin picketing that was itself peaceful when 
carried out "in a context of violence" because "the momentum of fear generated by past 
violence would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful." /d. at 293-
94. 
48. Marquis William Childs was born March 17, 1903, in Clinton, Iowa. After receiv-
ing his A.B. from the University of Wisconsin in 1923, he worked for the United Press before 
joining the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in 1926. He was a member of its Washington staff from 
1934 to 1944. An admirer of the Swedish experiments with cooperatives, he held that coun-
try up as a model for the United States in his bestseller entitled SWEDEN: THE MIDDLE 
WAY (1936). From 1944 to 1954, he was a widely distributed columnist for the United Fea-
ture Syndicate. He rejoined the Post-Dispatch in 1954, first as a special correspondent and 
then, until his retirement in 1968, as its chief Washington correspondent. Childs had excel-
lent connections that reached into the Supreme Court-including close ties with Brandeis 
and Stone--and even played an important behind-the-scenes role in the Court-packing fight. 
For biographical information, see 1943 CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 126-28 and WHO'S WHO IN 
AMERICA 1986-1987, at 494. His autobiography, WITNESS TO POWER (1975), is disappoint-
ingly thin. 
49. Harold Joseph Laski was born June 30, 1893, in Manchester, England, the son of a 
prosperous Jewish cotton shipping merchant. He studied at New College, Oxford, winning a 
first class in history in 1914. Turned down for military service on medical grounds, he ac-
cepted a lectureship at McGill University in Canada. From 1916 to 1920, he taught political 
science at Harvard, where he forged lifelong friendships with Justices Holmes and Frank-
furter. His prospects for future promotion were doomed because of his support for the 1919 
Boston police strike; instead he accepted a lectureship at the London School of Economics in 
1920. There he became professor of political science in 1926 and held this position until his 
death on March 24, 1950. His major scholarly interests were the political thought of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the idea of sovereignty, and the nature of the state. His 
facile pen, however, ranged, if at times superficially, over a broad variety of topics, including 
American politics and institutions. At the same time, he was active in the British Labour 
Party, serving on its executive committee from 1936 to 1949. Whatever Laski's private reser-
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tions are taken because Black takes the opposite one, but of course 
only One Who Knoweth All could be sure about it. 
I think that the boys behave pretty badly in seizing upon insig-
nificant points of difference and in slamming each other. Felix al-
ways did it to his friends, but we knew he loved us and didn't really 
despise our intellects or our characters as much as his debating 
slams might indicate. I gather, however, that some of his colleagues 
are not equally complacent under his shafts. 
Gus Hand5o told me a while ago that he told Stone that he had 
a group of able individuals, but not a court, and asked him why he 
couldn't keep them in line better. He answered that all that he 
could do was to persuade them from time to time to eliminate some 
of the things that they put in their draft opinions. 
When Bob Jackson was here at a Law Review dinner recently, 
I raised the point with him, and he answered that he was glad that 
for a time they were differing so among themselves, since the gen-
eral public had the notion that they would all be rubber stamps for 
the President or for the same point of view and it was good to estab-
lish that they were independent. Bob said, however, that he hoped 
that before long they could get more in agreement. Gus Hand 
thought there was nothing in favor of their present splitting off in so 
many directions and discounted the notion that it was important to 
correct public opinion that they were rubber stamps. 
I am greatly interested in watching Roberts. Evidently he was 
converted by Hughes or by the situation to the conclusion that the 
position of the Court as an institution required that he should sus-
tain the constitutionality of all federal legislation.5I However, he 
vations about Frankfurter's performance on the Court, the two remained sufficiently close 
that Frankfurter contributed an affectionate appreciation to a Laski symposium held in 1961 
by the British Broadcasting Company. See OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER THINGS THAT 
MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1956-1963, at 217-23 (P. 
Kurland ed. 1967). For a more critical appraisal of his political thought, see H. DEANE, THE 
POLITICAL IDEAS OF HAROLD}. LASKI (1955). SeeK. MARTIN, HAROLD LASKI, 1893-1950 
(1953), for a biography by a friend and admirer. 
50. Augustus Noble Hand, the first cousin of Learned Hand, was born July 26, 1869, in 
Elizabethtown, N.Y. Graduating Harvard College magna cum laude in 1890, he received his 
LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1894 and practiced law in New York City from 1897 to 
1914. A lifelong Democrat, he was appointed by President Woodrow Wilson in 1914 to be a 
federal district judge for the Southern District of New York. The reputation he gained as one 
of the country's ablest trial judges led to his elevation in 1926 by President Calvin Coolidge-
at the behest of Chief Justice William Howard Taft-to the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. He retired in June 1953, and died October 28, 1954. Biographical information and a 
detailed examination of his years on the Second Circuit bench are in M. ScHICK, LEARNED 
HAND'S COURT (1970). 
51. At the time of the 1937 crisis, Powell was not so generous in his appraisal. Noting 
Roberts's tum-about on the constitutionality of state minimum wage laws between Morehead 
v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
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remains independent and lawyerlike in statutory interpretation and 
in the interstitial common-law elements in his job. 
I think it outrageous that his colleagues are so ready to reverse 
former statutory interpretations that Congress has left untouched. 
If Congress reverses them by a new statute, its action is wholly pro-
spective. When the Court reverses, it is retrospective, and lawyers 
justifiably get the notion that they can no more have reliance on 
judicial decisions in this realm. Just last Monday, Roberts pointed 
out the evils of such reversals, and Felix joined with him.s2 How-
ever, Felix has enough sins of his own to invite expiation. 
Stone as Chief is no such leader or master as Hughes was. In 
conference he permits the fullest exploration at great expense of 
time. In many respects this is wise. In some, it is not. As to his 
own views, I feel that quite often he goes too far in new directions, 
though on the whole his record will be that of a high-grade states-
man. It certainly is an amazing development from the Dean whom 
you and I knew in old days.s3 
U.S. 379 (1937), Powell observed sarcastically: "I am not condemning Mr. Justice Roberts 
for changing sides or for acquiring enlightenment from all possible sources; but I should have 
been glad if he had thought it fitting to enlighten others with respect to what had enlightened 
him." Powell, supra note 13, at 20. 
52. See Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944), in which a seven-to-
two majority overruled the earlier unanimous decision in Plamals v. S.S. Pinar del Rio, 277 
U.S. 151 (1928) regarding the liability of a shipowner for an injury suffered by a seaman 
under the Jones Act of 1920. But what appears to have most exercised Roberts (and proba-
bly Frankfurter, who concurred in his dissent) was the public announcement by Black, Doug-
las, and Murphy that they planned to vote to reverse Gobitis at the first opportunity. In 
response, Roberts angrily protested that the tendency of the Court to disregard precedent had 
"become so strong ... as ... to shake confidence in the consistency of decision and leave the 
courts below on an uncharted sea of doubt and difficulty without any confidence that what 
was said yesterday will hold good tomorrow." Mahnich, 321 U.S. at 113. 
53. Powell probably had in mind Stone's strictures in his Hewitt Lectures against expo-
nents of "the so-called sociological jurisprudence" for advocating that judges "should con-
sciously endeavor to mold the rules of law to conform to their own personal notions of what 
is the correct theory of social organization and development, even though the result should be 
in many cases to disregard or overturn established rules of law." The judge's duty, he af-
firmed, "is primarily to ascertain whether the facts proved in the case before him are con-
trolled by rules of law which may be found in the precedents." And he went on to praise the 
courts' interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment-including ex-
plicitly the much-assailed decision by the New York Court of Appeals in lves v. South Buf-
falo Ry Co., 201 N.Y. 271 (1911), holding unconstitutional that state's workmen's 
compensation law-for the protection thus afforded against "the injustice of special and class 
legislation." H. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 41-44, 145-55 (1915). For Pow-
ell's explanation of the influences responsible for Stone's transformation, see A. MASON, 
HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 124, 254 (1956). 
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This is enough for a starter. I wish we could have a long ses-
sion together and reminisce over old times and fill in all the details 
that I have had to leave out here. 
Affectionately yours, 
Charles A. Beard, Esq. 
Pine Crest Inn 
Tryon, North Carolina 
